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Introduction 
 
 
Ambitious Framework Nation: 
Germany in NATO 
Bundeswehr Capability Planning and the “Framework Nations Concept” 
Rainer L. Glatz and Martin Zapfe 
Berlin is pursuing ambitious plans for security and defence, with significant potential 
for the Bundeswehr and European partner militaries. In the long-term, the Bundeswehr 
could well become Europe’s indispensable army, with Germany as a “framework nation” 
contributing decisively to NATO’s readiness. This will require the future German gov-
ernment to accept an unaccustomed politico-military leadership role. It will also be 
necessary to increase defence spending for the long term. 
 
A stronger German role within NATO, as 
envisioned by the Federal Government, 
ultimately requires increased military 
capabilities. Over the last months, the Ger-
man Ministry of Defence (MoD) has made 
significant progress in its force and capa-
bility planning with fundamental impli-
cations for both Germany and NATO. First 
thoughts on how to operationalize the 
strategic aims of its 2016 White Paper were 
formulated in March 2017 by the MoD’s 
Director General for Planning, Lieutenant 
General Erhard Bühler (the so-called 
“Bühler-Paper”). In the absence of a new 
and comprehensive capstone “Concept of 
the Bundeswehr”, this document currently 
constitutes the effective planning basis 
for the armed forces. 
In this process, the German and NATO 
perspective are inseparable. The aim for 
current Bundeswehr planning is twofold: 
Together with the British and French 
armed forces, the Bundeswehr is to form 
the backbone of European defence within 
NATO. In addition, and primarily through 
the much-discussed Framework Nations 
Concept (FNC), the Bundeswehr is to contrib-
ute, directly and indirectly, to the future 
development of allied forces, and thus to 
Europe’s capacity to act as part of NATO. 
The practical relevance of NATO policy 
guidance and capability planning targets 
is now the highest in decades and sets the 
basic parameters of Berlin’s capability 
planning. 
The Return of Collective Defence 
Any attempt to understand current Bundes-
wehr planning must first start with a look 
backwards. For several years now, intense 
budgetary pressure and operational neces-
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sities have forced the Bundeswehr to priori-
tize among the core tasks outlined by NATO 
in 2010: collective defence, crisis manage-
ment, and cooperative security. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Bun-
deswehr had focused increasingly on inter-
national crisis management. In 2011 the 
MoD’s “Defence Policy Guidelines” deci-
sively set crisis management operations 
as its chief structural determinant. In the 
process, capabilities for collective defence – 
as extended national defence – suffered. In 
addition, following the financial crisis, 
budgetary pressure was immense. Signifi-
cant savings were realised, inter alia, by not 
equipping army divisions fully according to 
the stated requirements. Where necessary 
to equip units for training and operations, 
the required equipment was to be made 
available through efficient management – 
meaning transferring it from other units 
supposedly less in need of it. This invariably 
created “hollow structures”. The Bundes-
wehr’s brigades, squadrons, and flotillas 
should – and could – support those units 
on operations, but not deploy as organic 
formations. A scenario of collective defence 
was, after all, considered highly unlikely. 
This planning assumption became obsolete 
when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. 
Consequently, the central tenets of cur-
rent Bundeswehr planning are a return to 
collective defence as guiding paradigm and 
an energetic effort to fill up the forces’ “hol-
low structures”. While collective defence 
and crisis management officially remain of 
equal importance, this claim lacks credibil-
ity. Structurally, the Bundeswehr prioritizes 
high-intensity operations for collective 
defence. The same single set of forces will 
then have to provide troops for crisis man-
agement operations. That is consequential, 
yet also implies that future missions (like in 
northern Africa) might only be sustainable 
by contributing smaller contingents. This 
compromise is the de facto basis for current 
Bundeswehr planning. 
“Basic Posture” and 
“Mission Structure” 
The tension between officially giving equal 
importance to all missions while de facto 
prioritizing collective defence is to be rec-
onciled through the concepts of “basic pos-
ture”, “mission structure”, and “mission 
“packages”. In principle, the Bundeswehr’s 
“basic posture” (“Grundaufstellung”) – its gar-
risons and the basic order of battle – will 
remain roughly unchanged. Contrary to 
some reports, there will be no significant 
increase in strength. The basic posture is 
supposed to reflect the primary task of col-
lective defence, especially for designated 
units of high readiness. Yet as a general 
rule all units are supposed to regroup into 
“mission structures” (“Einsatzsstruktur”) 
tailored to task-specific requirements when 
called to action. This is to be achieved 
through so-called “mission packages” (“Mis-
sionspakete”) that are intended to bridge any 
capability gap between the basic force pos-
ture and the operational requirements at 
hand. 
To illustrate, if an armoured brigade 
were to deploy to NATO’s eastern border, 
the unit would move swiftly and largely in 
its peacetime composition. If that same bri-
gade were to send soldiers to a stabilisation 
operation, it could swap its organic main 
battle tanks and infantry fighting vehicles 
for protected patrol vehicles externally 
stored as “mission packages”. 
This system is key to making sense of 
the figures circulating in media reports. 
The Bühler-Paper defines a “national level of 
ambition” with indeed ambitious targets, 
especially regarding the land forces. Much 
like today, the German Army is to have three 
divisional headquarters and eight brigades 
by 2032. By that date, however, all of these 
should be deployable simultaneously for 
the purpose of collective defence. Looking 
beyond 2032, it should even be possible to 
deploy up to ten brigades in “mission struc-
tures”. However, more important than the 
mere number of brigades are efforts to re-
constitute the Heer’s “hollow structures”. 
To regain lost operational capabilities, the 
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field army’s brigades, divisions and corps 
will be reassigned critical support units. 
For example, to regain critical indirect fire 
capabilities, rocket and tube artillery is 
to be organically reintegrated into the 
brigades, divisions, and corps through 
so-called “artillery capability packages” 
(“Fähigkeitspakete Artillerie”) of as of now 
unspecified strength and structure. 
As part of NATO’s Integrated Air and 
Missile Defense System, the German Air Force 
has traditionally been closely oriented 
towards the Alliance. With its flying plat-
forms and ground-based systems, the Luft-
waffe is to perform all the core functions 
of aerial warfare, while also preparing to 
provide the core of a Multinational Air Group 
capable of up to 350 sorties per day. Addi-
tionally, the air force is to regain a credible 
capacity for naval air warfare. The German 
Navy shall be able to provide at least 15 plat-
forms and vital support capabilities at all 
times. Further capability targets are defined 
for the cyber domain, special operations 
forces, the Joint Medical Service (Zentraler 
Sanitätsdienst) and Joint Support Service 
(Streitkräftebasis). Thus, while the army might 
benefit from significant investments, the 
air force and navy are supposed to modern-
ize and expand their capabilities primarily 
on the basis of existing platforms, and only 
secondarily by introducing new systems. 
In this process, the Bundeswehr consistently 
subordinates itself under NATO guidance 
and participates in multinational force 
development. NATO’s role manifests itself 
in two ways: First, through the Bundeswehr’s 
near-complete integration into NATO’s De-
fence Planning Process (NDPP); and, second, 
through Germany’s often misunderstood 
leadership role in the Alliance’s FNC. 
Guidance from Brussels 
On the first aspect: With its reorientation 
toward collective defence, the Bundeswehr 
follows NATO’s strategic guidance. The 
NATO summits in Wales 2014 and Warsaw 
2016 were landmarks of an increased Allied 
effort to credibly reassure Allies and deter 
a revanchist Russia. In its 2015 Political 
Guidance, the Alliance agreed on a new 
level of ambition based, inter alia, on an 
ambitious scenario of conventional collec-
tive defence (Major Joint Operation – Plus 
(MJO+)). On this basis, member states and 
NATO institutions have negotiated targets 
for future force planning. 
Germany, for the first time and as the 
first major member state, accepted the 
outcomes of the NDPP as the basis of its 
own planning. While Berlin continues to 
retain full control over the process – only 
those requirements accepted fully or in part 
form the basis of its planning efforts, and 
even those are merely politically binding – 
this is a significant step, both in terms of 
symbolism and planning guidance. The 
majority of targets described above are to 
be met by 2032. Thus, Germany’s national 
capability targets are to be in sync with 
NATO’s planning, in the long term aiming 
at qualitatively and quantitatively suffi-
cient capabilities across the Alliance. 
Towards an “Anchor Army” 
On the second aspect: The Bundeswehr is 
set to assume indirect responsibility for 
the force development of Allied armies. Few 
other aspects of current German force plan-
ning have received more international 
attention, and few are plagued by greater 
misconceptions, than Germany’s role in the 
FNC. If implemented consistently, and with 
strategic realism, this concept has the 
potential to substantially change the struc-
ture and character of European armed 
forces within NATO and beyond. 
Today’s FNC originates in a German idea 
of 2013. While NATO adopted the FNC the 
following year, it still is essentially designed, 
financed, and implemented by the member 
states. This results in an inherent flexibility; 
yet on the downside, it infuses a confusing 
ambiguity in terminology. NATO alone 
effectively knows three different FNC ap-
proaches, each grouped around a respective 
framework nation. Parallel to the German-
coordinated group, one group around the 
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UK’s Joint Expeditionary Force aims at a spe-
cific combined and joint task force for high-
intensity operations; the other, coordinated 
by Italy and significantly less ambitious, 
aims at developing capabilities for stabili-
sation operations. In addition, the EU, too, 
has decided to launch its own “Framework 
Nation Concept” (consciously adopted with-
out the letter -s at the end of “Nation”) in 
2015. This analysis uses the term “FNC” 
exclusively with regard to the group co-
ordinated by Germany. 
Processes reflect politics, and thus Ger-
many assumes a central role in the FNC. It 
chairs the main steering committees and is 
responsible for preparing and following-up 
the meetings of FNC defence ministers 
where basic decisions are made. 
The German-led FNC group has two dis-
tinct pillars which are only partially inter-
dependent. Since the beginning, it has 
focused on the coordinated development of 
capabilities in so-called “Clusters”; since 
2015, an additional focus has been placed 
developing large multinational formations. To 
this day, 19 nations have joined Germany. 
Out of this group of 20, seven have thus 
far committed troops to the “larger forma-
tions”, and several others are deliberating 
on this possibility. Formally, both pillars of 
the FNC are of equal importance. Consider-
ing its effects on current Bundeswehr and 
NATO planning, the development of “larger 
formations” is of higher significance. 
Capability Development 
The primary objective of the FNC’s first 
pillar is the coordinated closure of capa-
bility gaps by the participating states. While 
the initial identification of these gaps is 
done by NATO, the subsequent steps are 
taken by the FNC-members, coordinated by 
Germany. The German FNC has 16 clusters, 
each dedicated to one capability (such as 
Anti-Submarine Warfare). Members are free 
to decide in which clusters to participate, 
and have the alternative of obtaining ob-
server status. Each cluster is coordinated 
by a unit of the German MoD. 
This capability focus was not revolu-
tionary in 2013/2014 as similar programs 
already existed in both NATO and the EU 
(Smart Defence/Pooling & Sharing). Yet the pro-
gramme gained new relevance when, in 
2015, the FNC defence ministers agreed 
to link this capability development with 
NATO’s strategic-operational response to 
Russia’s aggression. Through this link, the 
clusters no longer necessarily represent 
stand-alone solutions but can provide capa-
bilities directly to the Alliance’s dedicated 
rapid reaction forces, such as NATO’s 
“Spearhead”, the Very High Readiness Joint 
Task Force (VJTF) and the enhanced NATO 
Response Force (eNRF). For example, a Role 
2 field hospital stood up in one cluster is 
supposed be made available for a specific 
VJTF rotation, thereby providing clear 
parameters for planning efforts. 
Developing “Larger Formations” 
It is only in the context of the FNC’s “larger 
formations” around the framework nation 
that current Bundeswehr planning can be 
fully understood. Interpreted elsewhere as 
essentially creating a “European Army” (pos-
sibly even dominated by Berlin), this pillar 
is first only a plan for multinational force 
development – although an ambitious one. 
Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, 
NATO was forced to once again lay the 
groundwork for credibly deterring Russia. 
A vital part of any such deterrent rests on 
credible conventional response options. 
Since 2014, NATO has made significant 
progress. The Alliance agreed to establish 
the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in the 
Baltic States and Poland, a politically bal-
anced and military necessary step. With the 
eFP now deployed, the focus shifts towards 
the question of follow-on forces to reinforce 
the still rather weak forces in place. The 
first “wave” in any conflict would naturally 
be the eFP, the forces of host nations and, 
possibly, unilaterally deployed formations. 
The eNRF, and especially its “Spearhead”, 
is to provide the second wave. Without any 
designated force for the third wave, this 
SWP Comments 35 
September 2017 
5 
would have to be stood-up from member 
states’ forces as they are. 
It is here where force development and 
defence planning meet, and it is in this con-
text where the second pillar of the FNC is 
to create effects. The aim of the “larger for-
mations” is twofold. Firstly, to enhance 
interoperability and harmonise capability 
development of Allied forces through close 
cooperation with designated Bundeswehr 
units. Secondly, to secure the basis for com-
bat-effective multinational divisions around 
Germany as the framework nation, and thus 
a basis from which to generate follow-on 
forces – with an eye primarily, but not ex-
clusively, to NATO’s east. This is new, and a 
politically and militarily highly ambitious 
agenda. 
Germany’s role in these formations and 
structures – whether on land, in the air, or 
at sea – would be significant. A view on the 
FNC’s timelines and objectives shows the 
integral links with current Bundeswehr plan-
ning. By 2032, and thus in parallel to Ger-
many’s national plans, the FNC force pool is 
to provide three multinational mechanized 
divisions, each capable of commanding up 
to five armoured brigades. As of now, two 
of these divisions would be formed around 
German divisional headquarters. Indeed, 
for the Luftwaffe, national and FNC-targets 
are partly identical: The FNC’s envisioned 
Multinational Air Group is a basic planning 
parameter for the German Air Force and 
would rely to more than 75 percent on 
German capabilities. With an eye to the 
navy, the FNC manifests itself most clearly 
in the re-establishment of the well-known 
regional focus on the Baltic Sea, establish-
ing a Baltic Maritime Component Command 
around German structures. In any scenario 
of collective defence Germany could thus 
well become the indispensable framework 
nation for most of its smaller FNC partners, 
and NATO as a whole. 
It is with regard to the nature of the 
“subordination” of Allied FNC units under 
German structures where the main mis-
conception arises. Although the Bühler-
Paper’s terms are not used explicitly, its 
paradigm that the “basic posture” does not 
necessarily have to mirror the respective 
“mission structure” could apply to the 
FNC as well: Neither is any Allied brigade, 
whether Dutch, Czech or Romanian, com-
pletely subordinate to the Bundeswehr, nor 
are they permanently stationed in Germany 
and fully integrated into Germany’s force 
posture. Each state, including Germany, 
retains full sovereignty over its forces and 
will ultimately have to decide freely how 
to equip and whether to deploy its forces. 
Naturally, closely linking European forces 
could lead to de facto dependencies; and, 
indeed, the FNC’s success may well depend 
on coordinated dependencies. As smaller 
states lose capabilities, their dependency 
on the larger framework nation grows – a 
dependency potentially institutionalized 
through the FNC. Yet just as all states are 
invited to “plug in” parts of their forces to 
German structures, they retain the explicit 
right to “plug out” at any point in time. 
This in itself should make it clear that con-
cerns about a “German-dominated Euro-
pean Army” only serve to obscure the many 
relevant implications of the FNC. At the 
same time, however, this lack of legally 
binding cooperation in times of crisis should 
also caution against overblown expecta-
tions of efficiency gains through the FNC. 
Critical Implications 
Of the many implications, six seem most 
critical for the Bundeswehr and Germany’s 
role in the Alliance. 
A Risky Prioritisation 
Structurally prioritizing high-intensity 
warfare and collective defence is a logical 
move that accurately reflects current chal-
lenges. Yet, like any prioritization, it carries 
risks. 
For NATO as a whole, not prioritizing any 
specific region – its “360-degree approach” 
of Wales – is an acceptable political com-
promise, as its member states’ armed forces 
naturally focus on their respective regional 
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challenges. While Paris, to take one 
example, focusses almost exclusively on 
counter-terrorism operations in Northern 
Africa and on its own soil, it has kept its 
presence in NATO’s eFP to a minimum. The 
Bundeswehr, however, is prioritizing collec-
tive defence, yet the “anchor army” will not 
will not be able to refrain from participat-
ing in potential missions to NATO’s south. 
While the triad of “basic posture”, “mis-
sion structure” and “mission packages” 
might be able to alleviate some strains on 
the force structure, it cannot be a panacea. 
Any new stability operation on the scale of 
ISAF, or an escalation of Resolute Support in 
Afghanistan, would come with many of the 
same challenges around force generation 
and sustainability that the Bundeswehr had 
to consistently overcome since 1990. The 
MoD’s planning is refreshingly clear. Yet 
policy makers in government and parlia-
ment have to be aware of the associated 
risks. 
Expensive Plans 
The Bundeswehr’s ambitious plans will 
require a further and long-term rise in 
defence spending. It will be important to 
provide planning security that allows for 
long-term projects to be implemented over 
more than one fiscal year. Significant pro-
gress has already been made. The MoD is on 
course towards a budget of 42.4 billion Euros 
by 2021, from only 37 billion Euros in 2017. 
What is more, Germany already wants to 
reach NATO’s defence investment target of 
spending 20 percent of its defence budget 
on procurement and investments by 2020. 
This trend is far more important than 
the politically sensitive and counterproduc-
tive debate concerning NATO’s “two per-
cent goal”. While member states pledged 
to work towards spending 2 percent of their 
GDP on defence by 2024 – with varying 
interpretations of this pledge’s binding 
character – Germany is still far from that 
threshold, even under the current increases. 
By 2021, defence spending will likely have 
risen to about 1.3 percent of GDP – current 
economic growth rates remaining the same. 
Yet irrespective from politically sensitive 
numbers, it seems clear that even invest-
ments of 130 billion Euros already prom-
ised until 2030 will not suffice to modern-
ise the Bundeswehr while meeting the FNC’s 
ambitious objectives. 
Crucially, the FNC will not help to save 
money – to the contrary. The concept’s 
long-term success might depend on more 
efficient spending through harmonized 
equipment of the “larger formations”. Yet 
the FNC aims at military efficacy first, and 
efficiency only second. Unlike Smart Defence 
or Pooling & Sharing, the FNC is a politico-
military investment project. As a framework 
nation, Germany will effectively – if in-
directly – finance the capability develop-
ment of allied armies. The FNC is not an 
economic but a security policy concept, and 
a politico-military leadership role will not 
come cheap. 
Avoiding the “Modernisation Trap” 
As a concept aimed at efficacy first, it is 
all the more important that Germany 
keeps the FNC focussed on its long-term 
goal: developing a balanced force pool from 
which to generate the forces for any con-
tingency rather than creating standing and 
multinational rapid reaction forces. Earlier 
efforts of NATO and the EU to develop 
multinational forces in peacetime fell into 
the “modernisation trap”. Both the NRF and 
the EU Battle Groups were successful instru-
ments of force development yet did not pro-
vide effective operational formations. Too 
cumbersome were their processes, too in-
flexible their structures, and too complicated 
the political negotiations among troop-
contributing member states. Whenever 
rapid and decisive action was needed, it fell 
mostly to overwhelmingly national forces 
that were quickly mobilized and deployed. 
The “modernisation trap” is inherent in 
the FNC’s inclusive approach: interoperabil-
ity is not a precondition for participation, 
but rather is the ultimate objective of co-
operation. While doubtless necessary to 
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increase the number of potential partners, 
a look at the current “troop contributors” 
to the FNC’s “larger formations” implies 
that for many of Germany’s Central Euro-
pean partners, the long-term modernisa-
tion of their forces is paramount. It appears 
critical not to politically overstate the ex-
pectations of the “larger formations’” com-
bat effectiveness – with the possible excep-
tion of the Dutch-German cooperation. 
Germany has often, and not without 
reason, been suspected by some of its larger 
allies of regularly favouring military inte-
gration with an eye on political symbolism 
first, and practical concerns only second: 
Cooperation for the mere sake of coopera-
tion. The FNC, however, is a systematic and 
structured approach to gradually build 
European forces within NATO, and to there-
by indirectly facilitate the generation of 
forces for specific missions. National forces 
will continue to be the bedrock of NATO for 
many years. Thus, Berlin will not be able to 
“cooperate its way out” of its responsibility. 
Spill-Over Effects to the EU 
With few exceptions, neither NATO nor the 
EU permanently control forces. That is no 
downside, however. Through its long-term 
focus on generating a pool of principally 
national forces rather than standing multi-
national units, the FNC might contribute 
to European security beyond the Atlantic 
Alliance. While FNC units may be assigned 
to NATO, the FNC’s “larger formations” 
remain under the sovereign control of the 
member states – and may thus also be de-
ployed for EU operations, thereby contrib-
uting significantly to the EU’s capacity to act. 
Coordination with EU-processes is fur-
ther facilitated by the European Defence 
Agency currently holding observer status 
within the FNC. If handled smartly, the 
new initiatives under the EU’s “Permanent 
Structured Cooperation” (PESCO), driven 
forward with great ambitions at the Franco-
German Council of Ministers in July 2017, 
can be fully complementary to the FNC. 
Given current rifts in in transatlantic rela-
tions, the FNC has the potential to strengthen 
the European pillar not only within NATO, 
but also beyond the Alliance. 
Political Challenges for Berlin 
For Berlin, finding itself in a politico-mili-
tary leadership role is a rather new and 
unfamiliar experience. Even if the FNC does 
not legally bind Germany, the Bundeswehr 
will become one of the most important 
armed forces in Europe; and through the 
FNC, it will accept an indirect responsibility 
for the development of Allied forces. It 
therefore seems vital that the political 
processes and debates in Berlin begin to 
reflect Germany’s growing weight. 
For the national debate necessary, the 
2015 conclusions of the “Rühe-Commis-
sion” contain concrete proposals. After a 
review of the law governing Bundeswehr 
deployments, the committee suggested 
steps to politically increase the binding 
character of these cooperation initiatives. 
In addition, discussing the nature of cur-
rent scenarios of collective defence and its 
political and constitutional implications, 
as proposed by the commission, does not 
appear any less relevant today. 
Necessity for German Leadership 
Finally, it will need continuous German 
leadership to fully realize the potential of 
the FNC and current Bundeswehr planning. 
This is not an empty argument. Any lack of 
leadership by Berlin would likely turn the 
FNC’s strength – its flexibility as an initia-
tive driven by the states – into a critical 
weakness. In the MoD, and within NATO, 
the FNC has to be led with clear respon-
sibilities and at high levels. 
As of today, the Bundeswehr’s plans as 
outlined above still float about at the lofty 
heights of ministerial concepts. Many ques-
tions remain open, and the Bundeswehr’s 
services are currently tasked with examin-
ing the manifold implications. Yet should 
Germany be willing to shoulder the long-
term political, military, and financial costs 
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 associated with the Bundeswehr’s ambitious 
plans and the FNC – and should the Ger-
man public support such a commitment – 
the MoD’s current course has the potential 
to leverage the Germany’s capability plan-
ning for its European partners within and 
beyond the Alliance – especially in times of 
crisis. 
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